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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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**ARMY TRANSFORMATION TO EXPEDITIONARY FORMATIONS**

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## *Preface*

In April of 2002 I was assigned to 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry, an Infantry Battalion in the newly formed Interim Brigade Combat Team. During this assignment I was exposed to the many facets of Army transformation and the initiatives set forth to achieve the Army's first real change in almost three decades. This experience inspired me to write about some of these experiences and how the programs could be implemented throughout the Army.

The purpose of this document is to explore the path of transformation in the United States Army from its inception in the late 1990's by then Chief of Staff GEN Eric Shinseki to the Interim Brigade Combat Team on through Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. Additionally the paper will expound on the future of the Army's current transformation roadmap and offer a proposal that the Army should implement in order to meet the needs of current operations as well as future plans and policies.

These discussions come from a combination of personal experiences, research, and current policies and programs. I would like to thank the faculty and staff of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University for their professional assistance and patience in completing this document- Specifically Dr. Christopher Jasparro and Col Curtis Anderson, USA.

## **Executive Summary**

**Title:** Army Transformation to Expeditionary formations

**Author:** Major Jeff Bryson, United States Army

**Thesis:** The purpose of this document is to explore the path of transformation in the United States Army from its inception in the late 1990's by then Chief of Staff GEN Eric Shinseki to the Interim Brigade Combat Team on through Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. Additionally the paper will expound on the future of the Army's current transformation roadmap and offer a proposal the Army should implement in order to meet the needs of current operations as well as future plans and policies.

**Discussion:** After 215 years of ever changing doctrine, tactics, formations, and mostly huge successes, the United States Army found itself sitting in the desert of Southwest Asia poised to invade another enemy trampling on regional security and threatening our countries national security. Saddam Hussein had recently invaded Kuwait and brutally terrorized this small country, the United States responded with an armed force to intercept this aggression and eventually push it back into Iraq. The first units to deploy were the famed 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne and the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Divisions, who responded in their usual timely fashion. We now know that if Saddam had chosen to, his Republican Guard (heavily fortified with T series Soviet tanks and mechanized units) could have easily engaged these two historic units and most likely caused numerous American casualties plus a public relations disaster in the United States. This did not happen and the Army took the time necessary to deploy an overwhelming force that eventually could not be reckoned with. The question, however, lingers not only for this operation but for future conflicts as well: what happens if the time to develop appropriate forces for the situation is not given.

This is the "bridging the gap" that General Shinseki talked about (Shinseki 2000), a situation that would not be addressed for another decade. The purpose of this paper is to briefly discuss the history of transformation and its current state; then propose recommendations over a number of topics which will include changes in formations, education, equipment, plus developing an "expeditionary mindset" appropriate to the size and scope of the United States Army.

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## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

As the United States Army entered the twenty-First century, a program of transformation had begun in earnest for the first time since the implementation of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle in the early Eighties. Then Chief of Staff GEN Eric Shinseki fully realized the short comings of the Army-that had little or no ability to “bridge the gap” between the arrival of quick response forces, such as the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division and the 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment, and more lethal heavy divisions such as the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Divisions or the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division.

According to Major General James Dubik, "All our combat power is useless if we cannot get it to the theater in time or

maneuver it tactically, right now our heavy forces have limited strategic deployability and our light forces have limited tactical utility.

Transformation will take care of that disconnect.” (Jblonsky Vol 31-2001) To that end, the Army began a program of transformation centered on the Interim Brigade Combat Team or IBCT (not to be confused with a future subject, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team). The Brigade was the initial foray into what would become the Army’s current Stryker Brigades and became the base level for Brigades.




Figure 1 Transformation Glideslope

This interim brigade had three vital components that enabled it to succeed from its establishment through tested combat operations in OIF I and II. First the brigade was built around the platform of the Stryker vehicle, akin to the Marines and Canadians LAV (Light Armored Vehicle) III, but with one key and noticeable difference, the weapon system. Both LAVs, and the Army's Bradley fighting vehicle, are equipped with the 25mm Bushmaster cannon. Most Infantrymen surveyed, during the building of this project, recommended that a smaller weapon system be used, since they feared a larger weapon system would create the temptation to engage enemy vehicles such as tanks that could penetrate the Stryker's armor. This potentially could also tempt the army into creating yet another mechanized fighting vehicle similar to the Bradley, thus losing the focus on the most lethal part of the Stryker, the nine man infantry squad.

The second component was a very robust increase in both personnel and how they are assigned within the brigade. The brigade was designed to be self-sustaining, all inclusive, and separate from the division models that were currently in use. These brigades consisted of three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and a Reconnaissance Surveillance Target Acquisition (RSTA) troop of 19 series MOS or cavalry scouts. The brigade also has a Military Intelligence Company, a Signal Company, and an Engineer Company. In addition, it has another battalion of support and logistics personnel designed to provide several layers of logistics of all classes of supply throughput to the brigade.

The brigade's third component was the combination of a communications platform with a new way of thinking and executing combat operations. A "see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively" methodology was incorporated with a suite of communications equipment down to every Stryker vehicle. This gear includes compact multi band FM radios and headsets

assigned down to the squad leaders. The Force Twenty One, Battle Command, Brigade- and -Below system (FBCB2) is a digital system installed in every vehicle that depicts maps, GPS locations of all vehicles within the brigade,




Figure 2 A Soldier Operates an FBCB2 in a Stryker vehicle

self populated dismounted locations, and an integrated system of “email” that can be sent from vehicle to vehicle like a text message.

The combination of these initiatives set the stage for the development of a unit that the Army had never before experienced and put the Army on the path to the type of transformation that GEN Shinseki had envisioned. Naming the vehicle “Stryker” changed the title of the brigade from “interim” to Stryker Brigade Combat Team or “SBCT”. The brigade was established at Fort Lewis, Washington, which became the “home” for SBCT’s (although there are currently three other SBCT’s in Hawaii, Alaska, and Germany, plus another National Guard SBCT slated for Pennsylvania).

During initial transformation however, the terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> occurred immediately changing the destiny of our armed forces. The first SBCT to be built and evaluated continued the transformation and maintained the schedule implemented by GEN Shinseki. Upon completion of a year and a half of training to include a milestone of back to back training center rotations at Forts Irwin and Polk, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry SBCT deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in the fall of 2003.



Finally after years of lobbying, development, and hard work, the Army had the beginnings of units that could “bridge the gap” (Shinseki 2000) between heavy and slow deploying armored forces and rapid deploying but very light infantry forces. From Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) that were far different than conventional Army units, to the durability and lethality of the vehicle itself, the SBCT proved itself to be the correct path the Army had to take. Now transformation had to be accomplished with our entire Department of Defense engulfed in combat operations on two fronts, with Soldiers waiting back at Ft. Lewis to begin building the second of these new brigades.

### **Current Formations: The Move to Brigade Combat Teams**

The successes of the SBCT allowed the Army to use it as a model to change the formations of its current Division based model. A traditional Army Division typically contains three infantry brigades with the appropriate supporting brigades of artillery, aviation, support, etc. The original designation of these new brigades was “Unit of Action” or UA. The premise for these new brigades was to add a fourth brigade to each division, modeled after the SBCT, with all of the self sustaining components located within each brigade, instead of at the division or separate level. Starting with Infantry Brigades, the Army developed formations similar to the ones used by the SBCT. The main difference was that one Infantry Battalion was eliminated, then augmented with the aforementioned RSTA or Reconnaissance Battalion (see figure 3).




Figure 3 Wire Diagram IBCT

A Fires Battalion, Signal Company, Intelligence Company, and Special Troops Battalion were integrated to enable these brigades to better conduct complex operations on the current and future battlefield(s). However these brigades fell short because of the elimination of that third Infantry battalion. The Army's purpose differs from all other services, including the Marine Corps, with the mission to put boots on the ground. Removing around 500 infantry Soldiers from this unit, regardless of the RSTA replacement does not make sense nor fit the Army's mission.

The Interim force now dubbed Stryker remains the same as it was built nearly six years ago. So this paper will now recommend implementing changes within Army Brigades based upon current Stryker brigade formations. It will then recommend changes that should be made in the composition of Army Divisions.

The SBCT footprint is not perfect by any means. Support mechanisms are not robust enough to tackle long-term combat operations without the benefit of a Forward Operating Base (FOB) or a similar support system that could establish a throughput pipeline of all classes of supply. The Marines in MAGTAF/MEF/MEW operations execute sea basing and is a part of their mantra, and a similar solution could serve the Army as well. The Army currently executes operations in support of OIF-OEF with shipping and air transportation of supply. Logistical Supply Area Anaconda located in Balad, IZ, is an example of an air based forward area that all resupply can be throughput from.




Figure 4 Wire Diagram SBCT

Contracted maintenance is a staple of the SBCT, but that comes with the universal maintenance program of the vehicle itself. This could serve useful in a division enhanced with Stryker's or any vehicle system for that matter, but would require some changes in operator level maintenance. Operators most likely (if designed on the SBCT model) would be less responsible for overall maintenance, and level II would drop as well, giving some maintenance MOS's less

validity. But where you possibly lose those capabilities, you gain by habitual maintainers of the fleet who don't rotate from post to post and potentially free up positions for other jobs.

The third and final Brigade level formation within the Army is the Heavy Brigade which is the "meat and potatoes" of the United States Army. This is what our nation depends on and expects a land based armed force to be. No formation currently on this earth can withstand the sheer might of the Army's Heavy Divisions, but all that power and everything that goes with it (good or bad)

comes at a

The  
departure  
from  
previous  
Heavy  
Brigades in  
the new  
combat teams




Figure 5 Wire Diagram HBC7

is a mixture

of the M-1 Tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle. Some divisions, such as the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division, would have a brigade of mixed vehicles, of pure M-1's, and another of mechanized infantry. The current "new" formation of the Heavy Brigade has a mixture (two tank companies, two mechanized companies, see diagram, figure 5) per battalion. Similar to the Infantry Brigade,

these are the only two “fighting” battalions; the third battalion is the RSTA. The rest is much the same with a Fires Battalion, Signal and Intelligence Company, Special Troops Battalion, etc.

The Army has come a long way with the changing of its formations to better replicate actual requirements for today’s battlefield. Although most of these brigades retain their divisional headquarters and lineage the actual managing of personnel and deployments has been done at the brigade level. Additionally, all of this change (yes, transformation?) has taken place while conducting combat operations on two fronts. With future plans to grow the Army, added pressure will be on future Army leaders to continue to fight *and* change in the coming years.

## **WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? LAYERED DIVISIONS?**

Entering into this century, no one could have imagined the ferocity of the terrorist attacks on the United States, much less the effect it would have on our military and how we fight. Since 911 the Army has updated its Operations manual (FM 3-0) and co-authored with the Marines a Counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24), both doctrinal readings that depart vastly from the Cold War era tactics and speak to the future of warfare. Even the future of doctrine and education is taking on a rapid transformation in order to meet the needs of current operations, while continuing to access, learn, and grow future leaders with both a COIN and conventional mindset.

So how does the Army organize itself to fight this type of warfare and still posture ourselves to maintain a conventional Army that can stand toe to toe with anyone on earth against enemies such as China, North Korea, and potentially other rogue states or state actors? The overwhelming opinion of leadership within the DOD is that our future adversaries will be asymmetrical and non contiguous, and most likely in an austere environment. Therefore the Army must adapt formations to be more lethal and expeditionary in nature. “It will take a more

responsive, more  
 deployable, more  
 versatile, more  
 agile, more lethal,  
 more survivable,  
 and yes, more  
 sustainable  
 Army" (Shinseki  
 2000). The  
 addition of that  
 third infantry  
 battalion back  
 into the IBCT




Figure 6 Wire Diagram 25th Infantry Division

would be a good start. The success of having this capability was proven in combat (with the SBCT) and would immediately serve to strengthen our current formations.

The Army must rearrange divisions to allow for a better and more diverse applicability to current and future tactical problems. Currently configured, our divisions are limited in their capability and serve only as one function. For example, a brigade within the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne is just exactly that, light airborne infantry. The 101<sup>st</sup>, concurrently, Air Assault, the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain-light infantry, and so on.

Whether intentional or not, the Army has created as close to the "perfect division" that can be, in order to provide a force big enough to bridge the gap at an Army level; the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. Although not traditionally located at one Army post, the 25<sup>th</sup> has combined

capabilities located at Hawaii's Schofield Barracks and Alaska's Fort Richardson under one divisional headquarters. These in combination are a light infantry brigade, an airborne brigade, an aviation brigade and two Stryker brigades (See fig # 6). This configuration allows the commander to react quickly with light airborne forces, have another follow on force of light infantry, easily deployable to an airfield that, in conjunction with Special Operations forces, could seize with the airborne brigade. Not far behind these brigades (dependent upon USAF platforms) and with much more survivability and lethality, comes one if not two Stryker brigades, landing potentially on the same airfield, controlled by the same divisions command and control (C2) elements.

This interoperability serves much the same function as a Marine MAGTAF, all inclusive units within the same division, making the planning and deployment process centralized and much easier. This should be labeled as a "layered" division, partly because that is how this unit would be deployed, in segments or layers, but only as needed for the threat or the tactical problem at hand.

Deploying in segments or layers applicable to the tactical threat would eliminate the need to pack up the entire division and move to one central location, only to again deploy from there (i.e. Desert Storm). Crucial to this divisional unit is the retention/addition of Army aviation to every division and, of course, to continue our relationship with the United States Air Force (USAF) for close air support (CAS) and transportation of these forces. Additionally the C-17 is the most appropriate aircraft to deploy these divisions, as they serve as a platform to conduct airborne operations (173<sup>rd</sup> in OIF I), and are still capable to lift heavy items such as the Stryker. Validated during the building of the Army's first Stryker brigade at the NTC, the C-17 can carry two Stryker's plus two HMMWV's.

These divisions could be configured in a number of combinations to give the Army even more flexibility. For example, one Stryker brigade, one light infantry brigade, and two airborne brigades, or virtually any combination thereof. As I mentioned earlier, the Marines use the technique of sea basing. The Army could use the same technique with these divisions either from CONUS, Army or Navy shipping, or from an airfield that was procured either diplomatically or through forced entry capabilities (possibly by even the same division that intends to use it). The theme here is expeditionary, flexible and in my mind we would deploy these units with the same habitual transporters and C2.

### **CHANGING THE MINDSET: EXPEDITIONARY LIKE THE USMC- BIG AND MEAN LIKE THE ARMY**

What about those two historic divisions: the 101<sup>st</sup> and the 82<sup>nd</sup>, and the heavy divisions such as the 1<sup>st</sup> Cav and 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry? As a land power Army, these formations must be kept intact. Maintaining the ability to project that power has thus far been very successful, it's the middle ground of "bridging the gap" where the Army needs to focus and *increase its strength*. "The Army is too small for its mission load, is wearing out both its equipment and its people and is in dire need of a recovery plan and program that will build a force adequate to the need (Kroesen 2008)."

The basic premise of putting boots on the ground with the ability to stop virtually any opposing force must remain. The Army has had very little trouble in accomplishing this task (minus some political buffoonery with budgets). The struggle in the past has been this middle ground. Leadership should focus on this point and keep our lethal heavy divisions as they are,



with only minor modifications such as technological upgrades or force enhancements as we grow in the future.

Of the current ten army divisions, only two are considered as “specialty divisions”, the 101<sup>st</sup> and 82<sup>nd</sup>. The remaining eight are comprised of five heavy divisions, leaving the rest (three) made up of combinations- The aforementioned 25<sup>th</sup>, a good fit for any situation, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry comprised of three Stryker brigades and one heavy brigade (Korea), and the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain with three IBCT’s.

GEN Shinseki’s plan to transform began with the Stryker brigades, and continued by moving formations that are easier managed as a Brigade Combat Team, but as previously depicted the Army is still not “balanced” and requires additional changes. The fix should be growing the Army by an additional four divisions, developing three of those divisions in a similar composition as the 25<sup>th</sup>, each with a different configuration so that when you add up all the divisions within the Army you get an even number of like brigades (Airborne, Stryker, Light Infantry etc.) deployable throughout the Army. The additional division would serve as an IBCT centric division, evening out the parity with the heavy divisions. At the end of the day the mix would be- five heavy divisions (current), two “specialty” divisions (current, 101<sup>st</sup>, 82<sup>nd</sup>), four “intermixed” divisions (e.g. 25<sup>th</sup>), and the remaindering three divisions of the current Stryker or pure light formations. This configuration would give the Army the flexibility to deploy its forces to the appropriate problem, cover the “middle ground”, and be prepared to adjust to another contingency or major operation elsewhere in the world.

Additionally, the mindset of the average everyday Soldier must be changed to an expeditionary one, no matter the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). In the past, it’s been the unit, not the MOS that has defined the Soldier. More rapidly deployable units have developed

an expeditionary mindset, but heavier and less frequently deployed units have a less expeditionary outlook on deployment. Since September 11, much has changed.

As an example of how far the Army has come consider this: in 1985, only a handful of units in the Army were issued the Kevlar helmet, Gortex outerwear, and a weapon comparable to today's M-4 (then the M-16A2). The 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne and a couple other light infantry units were the only Army units to have the gear. Today, every Soldier has an advanced weapons system, body armor (only the infantry wore it habitually as recent as ten years ago), a state of the art Kevlar helmet, and numerous other protective equipment and advanced communications gear.

This is fantastic, and speaks to the Army's leadership and tenacity in getting Soldiers the gear they need to do the job and protect them from injury. However, State of the art equipment is just the beginning; the Army must change the mindset to one of an expeditionary force. How do we do that? By starting expeditionary training with initial entry training and continuing that training when they arrive at their units.

Basic Combat training should begin with an initial issue of equipment that a Soldier would be responsible for during the entire length of a career. Giving a sense of immediate ownership would help create a change of mindset. Currently a Soldier receives and turns in equipment at every duty station he or she arrives at or departs from. A Central Issue Facility would only be necessary for exchanging damaged or lost equipment, requiring the Soldier to maintain and account for his or her gear for deployment.

Additionally a Soldiers "log book" of fitness tests, marksmanship qualifications, and deployment history beginning with basic training or a basic course for officers should be maintained from job to job and reviewed by a Soldier's immediate boss bi-annually. Unlike the

ERB (Enlisted Record Brief) or ORB (Officer Record Brief), this would not be just an administrative function, but would enable the Soldier and leader to track assignments and performance at the “counseling” level to ensure the Soldier is on the right track.

While combat has changed some of the Army’s thinking, allowing the Army to slip back into the mindset that thinks you won’t deploy if you are not in the combat arms, or a female or any other such preconceived notion, would be a grave mistake because Soldiers are trained, equipped, and deployed based on necessity and availability, not a gender or MOS.

Thus, the deployable division/brigade is made up of properly trained, equipped, and prepared Soldiers ready for the most likely asymmetric fight expected. Keeping those Soldiers in like units for the length of their careers could serve to be yet another tool in organizing and maintaining an expeditionary mentality. Spending enormous amounts of money to train Soldiers to perform specific tasks such as a Master Gunner of a Bradley fighting vehicle or M-1 Abrams tank, or a Jumpmaster in an airborne unit is absolutely appropriate and necessary. However, moving these qualified Soldiers out of those units en masse is absurd. While a Soldier may request to move around, and an effort to pair like skills with like units is in place, there is no formal regulation or Army program that keeps Soldiers in units that they are superbly qualified for.

There are other things that could also directly help change mindsets. Some of these ideas have been bouncing around various infantry units over the years. Initially developed and implemented in the 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment, they are usually described as the “big five” or six in some cases, usually found in a commanders “philosophy” letter to the troops or a unit SOP (not “official” Army doctrine). Following are some of the key ones.

## ***PHYSICAL FITNESS***

Clearly to be a Soldier in the Army there is an expected level of physical fitness to be obtained and maintained. One of the biggest events on the plate has always been running, and as I have enjoyed it over the years I have found that it is not necessarily the be all end all measurement of fitness. The preface of the current Army Physical Training Manual (FM 21-20) states that "if we fail to prepare our Soldiers for their physically demanding wartime tasks, we are paying lip service to the principle of train as you fight" (Pemrick 1999). This manual clearly states its purpose as a guide for preparing Soldiers physically for combat and that unit PT should be geared for that same purpose rather than preparing for the APFT (Pemrick 1999).

The 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment has incorporated a fitness test used specifically within the regiment, and scheduled for the summer of 2008, the USMC will implement some new events into their fitness test(White Letter 05-07, GEN Conway). All of these events are combat oriented with events such as ammo resupply, casualty carry, and maneuver under fire. The Corps will retain their current PFT however the new portion of the Marine PFT will not take place on the same day as the current PFT. The current fitness test for the Army requires a two mile run, pushups, and sit-ups-all in a uniform of shorts, t-shirt, and running shoes. The Army should do away with this entire test, mostly because we do nothing in combat in that uniform and the strength tests are not a true measurement of what is needed on the battlefield. I don't have a lot of combat experience but what I do have leads me to believe that our current testing system is antiquated and needs an overhaul that speaks to the sentiment of FM 21-20 of preparing our Soldiers for combat operations.

The Army should keep the uniform and the tasks for overall fitness training, but incorporate *Army level* requirements, not unit level “good ideas” on combat focused fitness training and testing. Some events could include a three mile movement as fast as possible with body armor, executing obstacles and carrying various items such as water cans, litters, and simulated people (in the form of the infamous 175lb “Rescue Randy”). Pull ups, crunches, rope climbs, pushing vehicles etc. could all be integrated into battle focused PHYSICAL training.

Then Lieutenant Colonel William O. Darby prepared the WWII era Rangers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion for their tasks with obstacle courses and speed marches with combat gear (Pemrick 1999). Bottom line is, lots of people smarter than me on what could work, but we must get away from the current system and PREPARE our soldiers for combat at the Army level, and not leave it up to units to decide.

### ***MARKSMANSHIP***

Borrowing a statement from my Marine brethren, “every Marine a rifleman”, the Army could stand to improve our marksmanship program to instill “every Soldier a rifleman”. Once again we have come a long way with superb equipment such as the M-4 Carbine, various optics and lasers, and of course an incomparable array of night vision devices that enhance our Soldiers ability to engage and HIT our targets. Where improvement is needed is much the same as physical training and the mindset applied to it. Instead of shuffling our Soldiers to a qualification range where he or she makes one or two attempts at hitting forty various pop-up targets, Army training doctrine should change to a standard that should be a variety of shooting scenarios from basic qualification to known distance ranges, to urban and ROE exercises that

take place over a week's time on a range, where possibly you are required to walk to in your combat gear (see PT comments above) and then execute the shooting tasks after the movement.

Once again there are many units in the Army that already do these types of training events, but that is a result of good leadership and various Army posts that support that type of training, not an Army program or standard. To transform to an expeditionary Army we must change our attitudes and standards for basic rifle marksmanship.

### ***UNIFORMS***

As a member of the Army's first Stryker brigade, I had the opportunity to test several pieces of equipment. One of these was the CCU or Close Combat Uniform, which evolved into the current uniform, the ACU or Advanced Combat Uniform. I'll quote one of my Command & Staff fellow students (ARMY) by saying, "I didn't join the Army to be in a fashion show", and he has a point. But there is something to be said about form and functionality. Briefly this, kudos to Army leadership by reducing the level of maintenance (starching, sewing, etc.) on all levels of Soldiers;

especially the young ones with less money. However our service can do better. Sew on your name and U.S.ARMY. The Velcro is not a functional system, and most Soldiers will not change their name and continue to serve the Army. Sew on skill badges OR do away with them on the



Figure 7 NATICK Prototype of  
MULTICAM

utility uniform altogether. Again the Marines got it right with the MARPAT designed uniform, with the digital system roughly patterned around the terrain. Having spent the last two years in the Ranger Training Brigade, my experience with the ACU in a woodland environment leads me to concur with fellow instructors and students (to a man) that the ACU “sticks out like a sore thumb” in ANY season of typical woodland foliage of North America.

A two uniform system of woodland or MULTICAM (figure 7) and a desert pattern would be more applicable to the terrain a Soldier could be deployed to, cut in a fashion of the ACU with transferable Velcro unit patches. Everything else is sewn on for the Soldiers benefit. Another cost deferral should be a uniform “reset” every four years on work and utility uniforms for all Soldiers, officers included, as a reward for sticking around. Enlisted Soldiers get a stipend for uniforms and that could be used for the maintenance of dress uniforms instead of spending the money on field or utility, long a problem in combat arms units that require more of their Soldiers time in the field.

Finally, a discussion on the current disposition of the Army’s dress uniform. Then Army Chief of Staff GEN Peter Schoomaker, in an attempt to save Soldiers money, directed that the classic “Dress Blues” become the singular uniform for the Army. While I applaud the intent (get rid of several useless uniforms, i.e. mess whites, dress greens, etc.) the results are less than effective. This is where the Marines and others get it wrong as well, too many uniforms at an astronomical cost. As with the heraldry the




Figure 8 WW II Era "Ike Jacket"

USMC displays', so should the U.S. Army.

Maintain the Army dress blues as is. This uniform has stood the test of time (lots of time); my first thoughts are of Brigadier General John Buford at Gettysburg in virtually the same uniform as I wear today. The proposal to transition this uniform into an all purpose uniform, complete with patches, badges and other adornments does not sit well with most Soldiers serving today and tarnishes one of the Army's classic and historic uniforms.

Keep this uniform as the Army's dress uniform; it is as recognized and cherished as the Marines dress uniform. Instead, get rid of the 1970's polyester "Dress Greens" and return a Khaki or Olive jacket (see figure 8) and pants that presents a Soldier as a professional, retains the ability to preserve army traditions of unit patches and individual awards, but also requires individual Soldiers to maintain a sense of pride that will go along with the expeditionary mindset of pride in appearance as well as pride in performance. The Army has an illustrious and rich heritage, every Soldier should be proud to display it.

## **THE WAY AHEAD**

The Army has served our nation well for over 230 years and during that time has changed appropriately with the necessary requirements of the day. Current threats and environments that our Soldiers have to deal with daily should be addressed by both our military and civilian leadership.

The Army began the process of transformation in the late nineties, but has been mired and sidetracked by nearly seven years of combat operations on two fronts. Change must take place in order to better serve our nations security needs and to survive the rigors that combat has placed on its Soldiers. "The Army has to express that need, the Defense Department has to endorse it and Congress has to authorize and fund the means and wherewithal. It is a requirement



that can no longer be postponed; the threats we face are not abating, and the long-term security and viability of the nation and perhaps the Free World are linked inextricably with the health of this Army. Congress has the constitutional responsibility to raise and provision the Army; the intent and commitment to fulfilling that incumbent duty has never been more important.” (Kroesen 2008).

The leadership of both the Army and our civilian counterparts has adjusted the size and makeup of the Army many times over the years. The trend has always been a substantial drawdown after major conflicts with the incorrect assumption that the current force structure is not appropriate and must be adjusted. This is usually politically driven without solid measures of requirements based on current threats and possible contingencies. In conjunction with the Army’s senior leadership, Congress should pass legislation mandating the size and composition of the Army based on the needs to secure the population of the continental United States and execute a two theater war. The Army should field fifteen divisions as a baseline.

To complete the transformation process requires the most daunting part of any change: implementation. Since 2000 the Army has made significant strides in moving towards future systems and formations that will enhance a combatant commander’s ability to deploy and solve tactical problems. However, the Global War on Terror has impeded transformation thus creating a need to reinvigorate the process. Beginning immediately, programs such as a new fitness manual and program, marksmanship training, and a uniform policy with initial issue need to be implemented throughout the Army, with a completion of these programs within three years.

Brigade realignment in its current state is satisfactory, however growing the Army is a must, and the additional five divisions should begin to be established beginning FY 09. These divisions would be created under the same program used to develop the initial SBCT with a

validation process at brigade level upon completion of their validation training. Building from scratch is not easy, but very doable.

The initial SBCT took two years to complete, while building, testing, and validating a new vehicle to implement into it at the same time. The initial two divisions can and should be built within five years, designed with a formation similar to the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry as described earlier.

Within eight years two more divisions of like formations built, with an additional division of light infantry similar to the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain complete by year nine. After a decade has passed the Army would be robust, transformed, and ready to accept any mission *quickly*. Our national leaders could then task the Army with virtually any contingency operation.

The Army must engage in a plan that will create real change on the ground, and unfortunately must complete this task while still conducting combat operations. The focus should shift to creating a fighting force that that can be more flexible, deployable, sustainable, and provide the adequate forces for our future conflicts. Our nation depends on the Army to achieve its goals, and it always has. We must grow and change, our future Soldiers that will execute these missions deserve it.

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FIGURE 1 TRANSFORMATION GLIDESLOPE 1  
Army Transformation Brief 2003 pdf

FIGURE 2 A SOLDIER OPERATES AN FBCB2 IN A STRYKER VEHICLE1  
[www.lewis.army.mil](http://www.lewis.army.mil) Stryker Net Web Page- 2007

FIGURE 3 WIRE DIAGRAM IBCT  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade\\_Combat\\_Team](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_Combat_Team)

FIGURE 4 WIRE DIAGRAM SBCT9  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade\\_Combat\\_Team](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_Combat_Team)

FIGURE 5 WIRE DIAGRAM HBCT1  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade\\_Combat\\_Team](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_Combat_Team)

FIGURE 6 WIRE DIAGRAM 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION1  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade\\_Combat\\_Team](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_Combat_Team)

FIGURE 7 NATICK PROTOTYPE OF MULTICAM1  
Defense Quarterly- Spring Edition

FIGURE 8 WW II ERA "IKE JACKET"1  
[www.baymil.com/product/1144](http://www.baymil.com/product/1144)